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ABSTRACT
SOFT FAULT DETECTION USING MIBs IN COMPUTER NETWORKS

by
Sachin Arora

To improve network reliability and management in today's high-speed communication
system, a statistical anomaly network intrusion detection system (KIDS) has been
investigated, for network soft faults using the Management Information Base (MIBs)
traffic parameters provided by Simple Network Management Protocol (SNIMP), for both
wired and wireless networks. The work done would be a contribution to a system to be
designed MIB Anomaly Intrusion Detection, a hierarchical multi-tier and multiobservation-window Anomaly Intrusion Detection system. The data was derived from
many experiments that had been carried out in the test bed that monitored 27 MIB traffic
parameters simultaneously, focusing on the soft network faults. The work here has been
focused on early detection, i.e., detection at low values of the ratio of fault to background
traffic. The performance of this system would be measured using traffic intensity
scenarios, as the fault traffic decreased from 10% to 0.5% of the background.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Today's communication network is still not very stable and reliable. Failures, hard or
soft, happen every once in a while. In order to have a bright future for the network, the
Internet, failures have to be dealt, soft or hard. Network intrusion detection aims to
protect networks and computers from malicious network-based attacks. Intrusion
detection techniques can be partitioned into two complementary trends: misuse detection,
and anomaly detection. Misuse detection systems model the known attacks and scan the
system for the occurrences of these patterns. Anomaly detection systems, flag intrusions
by observing significant deviations from typical or expected behavior of the systems or
users. The basic assumption of anomaly intrusion detection is that an intruder's behavior
will be noticeably different from that of legitimate users.
This research aims at designing a detector, the MIB Anomaly Intrusion Detection
(MAID) system. In defending against network faults/DOS attacks, achieving early
detection and warning is of paramount significance. The corresponding experimental
results demonstrate that MAID can reliably detect soft faults with traffic anomaly
intensity as low as 1% of the typical background traffic intensity, far below the intensity
level that causes harm, thus generating an effective early warning.
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1.1 Network Management

Network management is a broad term, as defined by ISO/OSI Specific Management
Functional Areas (SMFA), includes the following five functional areas: fault
management, accounting management, configuration management, performance
management and security management. Fault management is one of the most important
aspects of network management. Fault management is the detection of a problem, fault
isolation and correction to normal operation. The word "detection" is divided into three
parts: (a) whether there is a fault occurring, (b) if so, what kind of fault occurs, (c) where
the location of the fault is.
Traditional fault management emphasizes detection and processing hard network
faults and alarms. This method is necessary but when network alarms are captured,
filtered and analyzed, service and network failures are already present. Therefore,
traditional fault management is more reactive in nature. Since network performance
degradations are signatures of network faults and are preludes to service failures, being
able to detect them early and automatically enables timely and rapid fault containment
and correction, through which serious network and service failures can be avoided. This
approach complements the traditional fault management.

1.2

Classification of Faults and Fault Management

1.2.1 Types of Faults

Network faults can be classified into two categories:
Hard failures, in which the networks, or some of its elements, are not able to

deliver any traffic at all. It may consist of links or nodes failures. Soft failures,
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network/service anomaly or performance degradation in various performance parameters,
i.e., decrease in bandwidth, increase in delay, etc.
All, the system administrators as well as the users, can easily notice a hard fault.
However, defining and otherwise characterizing and detecting soft faults are difficult.
Wireless networks are particularly vulnerable to soft faults in that they have much lower
bandwidth than their wired counterparts, while they are more prone to overloads, noise,
congestion, etc.
Once detected, hard faults are corrected. Soft faults, however, are generally
tolerated in the short term and may be monitored for longer-term trends. The goal of fault
management is to address both hard and soft faults to maintain consistent network
performance.

1.2.2 Types of Fault Management

The ways to manage the fault can be categorized as either reactive or proactive. The
reactive fault management system waits for a problem and then troubleshoots it, i.e. you
react to the problem after it has occurred. The proactive management system preset
critical operational thresholds, such as network utilization. This is where you are
monitoring components and the system provides a root cause alarm for the problem at
hand and automatic restore processes are in place where it is possible to minimize
downtime. The work done here contributes towards designing a Proactive Fault Detection
[12,13,14,15] system.

Figure 1.1 Proactive and Reactive Fault Management.

Proactive detection of network failures and performance degradations is a key to rapid
fault recovery and thus robust networking, and has been receiving increasing attention
lately. Proactive network performance and fault management is concerned with
performance monitoring/analysis and fault detection capable of detection soft network
and service faults automatically and adaptively in the midst of networks performance
fluctuation and evolutions.

CHAPTER 2
SIMPLE NETWORK MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL AND
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION BASE

2.1

Simple Network Management Protocol

Network management system contains two primary elements: a manager and agents. The
Manager is the console through which the network administrator performs network
management functions. Agents are the entities that interface to the actual device being
managed. Bridges, Hubs, Routers or network servers are examples of managed devices
that contain managed objects. These managed objects might be hardware, configuration
parameters, performance statistics, and so on, that directly relate to the current operation
of the device in question. These objects are arranged in what is known as a virtual
information database, called a management information base (BIB). Simple Network
Management Protocol (SNMP) [18,19] allows managers and agents to communicate for
the purpose of accessing these objects. The relationship between the management station,
the agent, and the MIB is shown in the following figure.
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Figure 2.1 SNMP Managed Configuration.

An SNMP-compliant MIB contains definitions and information about the
properties of managed resources and the services that the agents support. The manageable
features of resources, as defined in an SNMP-compliant MIB, are called managed objects
or management variables (or just objects or variables).
A management station gets and sets objects in the MIB, and an agent notifies the
management station of significant but unsolicited events called traps. All message
exchanges between the management station and its agents take place using the Simple
Network Management Protocol (SNMP), which uses the UDC layer in the network layer
stack.
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Managers invoke an SNMP client on their local computer, and use the client to
contact one or more SNMP servers, that run on remote machines. SNMP uses a fetchstore paradigm. A separate standard for a Management Information Base defines the set
of variables that SNMP servers maintain as well as the semantics of each variable.

2.2 MIB Information Structure
The structure of management information (SMI), an SNMP standard described in the
RFC 1155, defines the structure of the M1B information and the allowable data types.
The SM1 identifies how resources within the MIB are represented and named. The
philosophy behind SM1 is to encourage simplicity and extensibility within the MIB.
The SNMP specification includes a template, known as an Abstract Syntax Notation One
(ASN.1) OBJECT TYPE macro, which provides the formal model for defining objects
and tables of objects in the MIB.

2.2.1 MIB Object Identifiers
Each object in the M1B has an object identifier (01D), which the management station
uses to request the object's value from the agent. An OID is a sequence of integers that
uniquely identifies a managed object by defining a path to that object through a tree-like
structure called the OID tree or registration tree. When an SNMP agent needs to access a
specific managed object, it traverses the OID tree to find the object. Each one of the
nodes on the tree is assigned a label consisting of an integer and a quick description.
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Figure 2.2 The MIB OID Tree.

The Identifiers (names) for the MIB objects are issued from this tree. The
identifier of an object (the OID, Object ID) is a series of integers guiding through the tree
from the root to the leaf where the object resides (for example all objects in mib-2 would
start with 1.3.6.1.2.1...). The text part of each node helps to recognize what the string of
number stands for.
Thus object name:
iso_org_dod_internet_mgmt_mib2_interfaces_ifTable_ifEntry_ifOperStatus is easier to
understand than 1.3.6.1.2.1.2.2.1.8, the same in the number format.

2.2.2 MIB-Il (RFC 1213)
MIB has been developed further into MIB-2 to support more standard objects and groups,
and it has it's own node on the tree. Eleven groups are referenced in the original MIB-Il
document (RFC 1213) [17].
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One of these, CBOT (ISO Common Management Information on top of TCP/IP), is no
more used because this project was abandoned. The 10 remaining groups describe the
most basic information needed to manage a TCP/IP Internet.
Below is the development of the BIB Node:

Figure 2.3 MIB-II Sub Tree.

2.3 Promise of MIB based Anomaly NID
In network intrusion detection (NID) systems, gathering the network traffic data needed
to evaluate the security status of the network is a significant portion of the overall
processing burden. However, many networks already deploy SNBP network
management, thus BIB objects are available to collect data, in many network elements.
By enlisting the BIBS objects, MAID promises a lower overhead approach for analysis by
the anomaly detection engine. The network manager queries the agents and retrieves the
value of BIB objects to perform monitoring functions.
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The advantages of this approach are:
•

If an SNBP agent already is operating at the node, as is likely, the collection of
local information needs little in additional resources.

•

A large number of traffic related performance parameters are readily available, as
needed for network intrusion detection.

•

The standardized representation of the data collected in each node facilitates data
exchange between nodes.

•

It can be extended to collect additional data relative to network activities.

•

It does not depend on the operating system.

•

There are several object and parameter groups in standard MIB II that collect
information on different layers and protocols, e.g., IP, ICMP, UDP, TCP, etc.
The limitation of this approach is that it is geared to handle traffic related

parameters, it is basically a NID system, so it is not sufficient by itself to detect escalation
of privilege, buffer overflow, etc., the type of attacks that a host intrusion detection (HID)
system would detect.

CHAPTER 3
IMPLEMENTATION

3.1

Simulation of Internet Traffic in Wired Network

A stand-alone network was constructed for the purpose of carrying out actual attack
experiments in a controlled environment. The network topology is shown in Figure 3.1. It
comprised of four network subnets, connected by a layer 3 switch. One subnet
constructed and delivered the background traffic, fashioned to follow some desired
traffic, according to a chosen distribution. In these experiments, traffic with self-similar
characteristics that emulated Internet type traffic was constructed, as the background
traffic of a given intensity. Another subnet consisted of attack stations of various
operating systems, mainly Windows and Linux. The attack and background network
traffics were directed toward the victim stations that comprised another subnet. There
was also a wireless victim subnet that was not utilized here. The Layer 3 switch provided
the routing functionality needed for communication from one network segment to another
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Figure 3.1 Test Wired Network.

The names of the subnets (Virtual LANs) describe by themselves what their function was
in the test bed.
The Traffic segment had been set up to generate background traffic. All clients
sitting in this segment generate traffic, which hit the victim segment.
The System/Victim segment had been setup to receive random patterns of
predetermined traffic from both the traffic and devices residing directly within the
System/Victim network.
The Wireless segment had been setup to compliment the existing setup, which
had been configured. Since wireless technology is utilized in various environments, an
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opportunity was introduced to add the technology into the multiple networks and study
various findings. In order to initiate the solution, an access point had been selected to
connect into the environment.
The Attack segment had been setup to send different types of attacks including
random patterns of the fault traffic.
Bany actual network experiments had been carried out focusing on the Denial of
Service (DOS) class of attacks, including UIDP, ICMP and TCP flooding attacks. These
scenarios ranged from modest (10%) to small (0.5%) values of the ratio of attack to
background, R=(AIB), traffic intensity. The purpose was to evaluate the performance of
BAID, as the ratio R became small, to almost insignificant levels.

3.2

Simulation of Internet Traffic in a Wireless Network,
in a Wired Environment

Wireless mobile ad hoc networks differ from wired networks in that their topologies are
highly dynamic and their links can have a relatively high bit error rate. These properties
make it difficult to conduct controlled, repeatable experiments with routing and other
protocols in a wireless ad hoc network environment. The dynamic topology switch
emulates a wireless mobile ad hoc network using standard Ethernet physical connections.
Traditional switches for wired networks, such as Ethernet switches, ATB
switches, and IP routers, rely on multiple access control (BAC) or Internet protocol (IP)
address information to determine forwarding and the emulated connectivity cannot be
altered without altering MAC or IP level addressing. Further, conventional commercial
switches cannot emulate the effects of packet loss or data rate limitations. Thus, a wired
network and a traditional switch cannot be used directly to emulate a mobile ad hoc
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network. The above problem calls for a solution where a standard wired network uses a
BANET emulator [8] to create equivalent conditions that mimics a wireless ad hoc
network.

3.2.1 Installation of MANET EMULATOR (Dynamic Topology Switch)
•

The operating system used to build this software switch was Linux Redhat 7.0,
kernel version 2.2.16.

•

It had multiple network interfaces, either by using multiple interface cards and/or
multiple-port interface cards/PCI Extender Card. An example block diagram of
the network that may be built using this software switch is shown below.

Figure 3.2 Sample network implementing the Dynamic Switch with 5 NICS
•

The installation required a kernel recompilation [3].
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3.2.2 Features of Dynamic Topology Switch
The dynamic topology switch emulates a BANET using standard Ethernet or
other wired physical connections and requires no changes to the network's hosts.
The basic concept of operation for the dynamic topology switch is to control the
connectivity of "mobile" nodes using the central hub in a star network. The dynamic
topology switch can switch traffic between any set of connected hosts, based on a local
switch connectivity table that can change dynamically. The switch is transparent to all the
other nodes at and above the BAC layer. All incoming frames are switched based solely
on the input interface and the switch connectivity table information. The switch does not
alter the BAC frame or IP datagram information in anyway and, in particular, it does not
add any address information of its own to the BAC frame or IPA datagram. Hosts receive
packets from all current neighbors, including packets not addressed to the host.

3.2.3 Dynamic Topology Switch Software
The software can be divided into three parts:
(i) User space program
(ii) Broker program
(iii) Kernel space program
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Figure 3.3 Components of the software of Dynamic Topology Switch.

The user space program is responsible for interactions with users. The kernel space
program handles kernel interruptions and received packets. The broker program contains
a character device driver, which is used to exchange information between user space and
kernel space. The user space program first translates user inputs or command files into
the proper command format. The translated commands are written into the character
device in the broker program. The broker is a module that can be loaded in superuser
mode. The broker creates a character device and sets all network interfaces to
promiscuous mode during initialization. The broker program also maintains the switch
connectivity table and token buffer queues. It continues to listen for input/output
interrupts from the character device and calls the proper procedures to handle requests
from the user space program. This allows users to use commands or input files to control
the dynamic topology switch as a function of time. The broker is also responsible for
moving outgoing packets into the proper buffers of the network devices.
The kernel space program deals with packet capture and dynamic forwarding.
Once a packet is captured, the kernel procedure enters the dynamic switch block if the
character device driver is loaded. The kernel space program looks up the outgoing port(s)
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for each incoming packet in the switch connectivity table via the broker program. The
switch does not examine packets, but they are duplicated if necessary so that one
incoming packet can be delivered to multiple output ports. The kernel space program
forwards packets to the proper devices using the sending procedure in the broker
program.

3.2.4 Mobile Network Parameters that can be Emulated Using the Dynamic
Topology Switch
Packet drop Rate
Bobile ad hoc networks are implemented using wireless communications where packet
drops due to bit errors may be likely. In the dynamic topology switch, the packet drop
rate for each connected channel can be controlled. It uses a two-state discrete-time
Barkov model, for packet drops, as shown below.

Figure 3.4 Two-state Barkov chain for packet drop process.

In the two-state Barkov model, a channel can be in one of two possible states, "good" or
"bad." The state transition diagram is shown in Figure 3.4. The probability of dropping a
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packet, i.e., the probability of a packet error, is different in each state. PG is the
probability of dropping a packet while in the good state and

PBS, PB > PG,

is the

probability of dropping a packet while in the bad state. Given a present state, a channel
may transfer to the other state or stay in the present state with certain probabilities. P1 and
P2 are the transition probabilities of staying in the good and bad states, respectively.

(II) Constrained capacity
The capacity of wireless links may be less than the capacity of the wired links used in the
test bed. Constraints on available bandwidth are based on a leaky bucket token buffer
model.

Figure 3.5 A Leaky Bucket Token Buffer Bodel.

In the leaky-bucket token buffer model, no packet can be sent unless there is a token in
the token buffer or a new token arrives. There is an upper bound on the size of the token
buffer. A token arrival rate of r tokens per second, a token buffer size of B tokens, and an
allowable transmission size of bytes per token are used to determine the bandwidth
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constraint. The equation below specifies the maximum allowable data rate, where C is the
transmission rate or emulated capacity.

3.2.5 Limitation of Dynamic Topology Switch
•

The link layer effects cannot be emulated, since the dynamic switch software did
not alter BAC layer information while transmitting packets from one interface to
another.

•

The other issue, which this software did not take care of, was scalability. The
network size was limited due to operating system limitations. Only 11 nodes
could connect to the dynamic switch, thus a wireless network with only 11 nodes
talking to each other.
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3.2.6 The proposed test bed for collection of MIB Data in wireless networks

Figure 3.6 Emulation of BANET using the Dynamic Topology Switch.

Keeping in mind the scalability issue, the above network test bed was proposed.
Here we would have used just two interfaces on the dynamic switch, with each port being
a part of different subnets (10.10.10.0 and 11.11.11.0). A hardware switch acting as a
layer 2 hub could be connected to each interface. Nodes could be attached to this
hardware switch.
The same client server paradigm [4,5,6,7] could be used to simulate internet
traffic (background and attack traffic). A background and fault server could be run on
each subnet with their corresponding clients running on the other subnet. This way all
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clients on one subnet would be talking to their corresponding server on the other subnet,
through the wireless channel emulated by the dynamic switch. SNBP (MIB-II) based
data collection could have been done on both the servers.
This proposed test bed could have removed the scalability limitation, of the
dynamic switch software, to some extent.

3.2.7 Second test bed proposed for collection of MIB Data in wireless networks
Due to the limitations faced during the use of software switch, another network test bed
was considered to simulate internet traffic and collect BIBS data.
This time, Virtual LAN (VLAN) technology is used to create logically separate
LANs on the same physical switch. Each port of the switch is assigned to a VLAN. The
communication between switches and routers take place through trunking. For two nodes
on two different VLANs to communicate, the data must travel from the switch to the
router and back again to the switch. In this way, the nodes are like mobile users and the
switch and router act as the base stations.
For this architecture using a hardware switch, there is no limit on the number of
nodes that act as wireless nodes. Moreover, the hardware switch can be cascaded to
support more nodes. An example network using this test bed scheme is shown below.

Hardware switch consists of three components:
VLAN routing, traffic control, and packet error rate. The first two components are
becoming the Linux standards. We can use them directly and focus on the design of the
channel simulator.
A random packet dropper function can be added to the Linux kernel of the router
machine, to simulate channel simulator with packet error rate. By setting different packet
drop probabilities, the router acts as a wireless channel.
To simulate Traffic control, we can use a new linux package called Linux
advanced routing (zproute2), which contains a traffic control mechanism (tc). The traffic
control system sends packet to filters and queues to implement flow control and
bandwidth allocation.

CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENT - DATA GENERATION AND COLLECTION

Understanding the nature of network traffic is critical in order to properly design and
implement computer networks. Ethernet traffic exhibits self-similar [1,2,9] properties.
Self-similarity means that an object is composed of sub-units and sub-sub-units on
multiple levels that (statistically) resemble the structure of the whole object.
Self-similarity describes the phenomenon where a certain property of an object is
preserved with respect to scaling in space and/or time. The background and fault (attack)
traffic generated during the experiments done here followed two distributions in order to
generate self-similar traffic, namely Careto and Weibull distributions.

4.1 Procedure
All experiments and data collection were done on the wired network as shown in Figure
4.1. The network test bed was operated using the Client — Server paradigm, with the
management station running in the server. The management station collected 27 traffic
parameters corresponding to four MMIB groups: IF, IC, TCC and UDC, for each network
element monitored, i.e., 9 parameters from the Interface Group, 6 from the IP Group, 4
from the UDC Group, and 8 from the TCC Group. For example, the UDC group consisted
of the udpinDatagrams, udpinNoPorts, udpinErrors and udpOutDatagrams parameters.
The selection of the specific subset of the traffic parameters is based on their relevance to
the network traffic and their inter-relationship, derived from domain knowledge as well
as from some correlation studies.
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Background and fault traffic were generated with different intensities to simulate
the real-time internet traffic. For this purpose, two client server programs were run, one
to simulate background traffic and the other to simulate fault traffic (attack traffic). The
background and fault traffic servers were ran on a victim machine in the Victim ULAN,
background traffic clients were ran on the traffic subnet and a fault traffic client on the
Attack ULAN.
The background traffic clients generated packets of sizes that followed the Pareto
distribution. The rate at which the packets were generated followed the Weibull
distribution.
The fault traffic model generated network fault traffic in a periodic pulse. The
time period in seconds was given as the input.
The size of the packet could follow any of the following distribution: Exponential
Distribution, Constant Distribution or Pareto Distribution. The packet rate could follow
any of the following distribution: Exponential, Constant, Pareto or Weibull Distribution.
The figures on the next two pages show an example of running background traffic
servers/clients and fault traffic server/client programs.
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Figure 4.4 Fault traffic client sending out packets to Fault traffic server.

In conducting the attack, one client in the "Attack VLAN" sends the attack
packets to the "System/Victim VLAN". The attack packet length is 100 bytes with a
constant distribution, while the attack packet rate will vary according to the different
attack intensity scenarios.

27
For each simulation scenario, network traffic was collected over a duration of 10
hours. The data were recorded periodically, with a period of one second.

4.2

The Traffic Monitor

The data collection throughout this research was carried out using a commercially used
IpSwitch, Inc. network management tool, called WhatsUp Gold [10].
WhatsUp Gold, a graphical network mapping, monitoring and notification
solution that helps keeping the network up and running, is a very useful tool to monitor a
wide range of devices, applications, and services for network problems. With WhatsUp
Gold one can easily filter through events and locate the log data for any type of network
event by searching on event type, IP address or device name. This saves time, provides
more flexibility, and also gives users more control since they can pinpoint information
without having to sort through a flood of event data.
WhatsUp Gold automatically detects the devices and hosts in a network and then
creates a network map. It polls all the systems in the network with a polling frequency
that can be set by the user. With the auto discovery wizard, it creates an accurate
representation of the network based on information contained in the host computer or on
the network. Auto discovery was used to create a map of the test bed (figure 3.1) as
shown below.
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Figure 4.5 Network map as detected by WhatsUp Gold.

Links between SNBC enabled devices provided color-coded indication of their up
or down status. Links, which were down and attribute the outage to a specific device
interface, could be seen using this tool. Devices with multiple interfaces are fully
supported in network mapping, monitoring and alert notification - allowing accurate
depiction of the network topology and to pinpoint network problems down to a device's
interface, either physical or virtual.
In this research, this tool was used to monitor SNMP enabled devices for
acceptable ranges of specific BIB variables. The SNBCUiew feature of this tool
displayed the status of interfaces on a device and let us view MIB values. BIB traffic
data could also be graphed to show throughput in real-time.
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The SNBP Uiewer displayed an icon for each interface on the device .A Typical example
is as shown below.

Figure 4.6 SNMP Uiewer.

The first icon from the left gave the MIB parameters for the System Group, the
second one gave the loop-back interface information, and the third one gave the MIB
parameters associated to the actual ethernet interface on the computer.
The following snapshot shows the WhatsUp Gold monitor the 27 MIB parameters
monitored during this research.

30

Figure 4.7 Traffic monitoring using WhatsUp Gold.

CONCLUSION

After monitoring background and fault traffic on wired network, it is proposed that
similar collection of BIB data can be done on a wireless network as well. This paper has
proposed two test beds to emulate a wireless model in a wired environment and facilitate
similar collection of MIB data. The data collected using both wired and wireless network
test beds may be used for experimentation purposes for the development of the fault
detection system, which would be a part of the final anomaly network intrusion detection
system.
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